Cryptosystem

Traditional Cryptosystems:

- The two parties agree on a **secret** (one to one) function f.
- To send a message M, the sender sends the message $f(M)$.
- The receiver computes $f^{-1}(f(M))$.

Advantage: Cannot be broken if the function f is used only once (or very few times).

Disadvantage: The two parties need a **secure** channel to agree on secrete keys.

Public Key Cryptossystem

Bob needs to send a secrete message to Alice:

- Alice generates two functions $P_A()$ and $S_A()$, such that

  1. For any legal message M, $S_A(P_A(M)) = M$.
  2. $S_A()$ and $P_A()$ are easy to compute.
  3. It is computationally hard to compute $P_A^{-1}()$.

- Alice publishes the function $P_A()$.

- Bob sends Alice the message $P_A(M)$.

- Alice computes $M = S_A(P_A(M))$.

To decrypt the message without the function $S_A()$ one needs to compute $P_A^{-1}()$.

Digital Signatures

Bob needs to verify (and be able to prove) that Alice sent him a message M:

- Alice generates two functions $P_A()$ and $S_A()$, such that
  1. For any legal message M, $P_A(S_A(M)) = M$.
  2. $S_A()$ and $P_A()$ are easy to compute.
  3. It is computationally hard to compute $P_A^{-1}()$.
- Alice publishes the function $P_A()$.
- Alice sends the message $(M, S_A(M))$ to Bob.
- Bob verifies that $P_A(S_A(M)) = M$

To forge Alice's signature one needs to compute $P_A^{-1}()$.

Challenge

How to generate a pair of functions $(S_A(), P_A())$ such that for any M:

- $S_A(P_A(M)) = M$ and $P_A(S_A(M)) = M$ and it is easy to compute.
- Without the function $S_A()$, the function $P_A()$ is hard to "invert" ("one-way function").

Almost all cryptosystems today use public-key.

We'll study one such method: RSA.

The RSA Cryptosystem

1. Select at random two LARGE prime numbers p and q (100-200 decimal digits).

2. Compute $n = pq$.

3. Select a small odd integer e relatively prime to $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$.

4. Compute d such that $ed = 1 \ mod \ \phi(n)$ (d exists and is unique!!!).

5. Publish the **public key** function $P_A(M) = M^e \ mod \ n$ (the pair (e, n)).

6. Keep secret the **secrete key** function $S_A(C) = C^d \ mod \ n$.

Theorem 1. *The RSA system is correct, i.e.*

- $S_A(P_A(M)) = M$;
- $P_A(S_A(M)) = M$

Divisibility

Integer a divides integer b iff $\frac{b}{a}$ is an integer.

The **greatest common divisor** of a and b,

$$d = gcd(a, b)$$

is the largest integer that divides both a and b.

Integers a and b are **relatively prime** if

$$gcd(a, b) = 1$$

Integer p is a prime number if for any $a < p$, $gcd(p, a) = 1$.

Theorem 2. *If $d = gcd(a, b)$ then there are integers x and y such that*

$$d = ax + by$$

Proof. Let s be the smallest positive integer such that $s = ax + by$ for some integers x and y.

Let $q = \lfloor \frac{a}{s} \rfloor$.

$$\begin{aligned} a \; mod \; s &= a - qs \\ &= a - q(ax + by) \\ &= a(1 - qx) + b(-qy) \end{aligned}$$

Thus $a \; mod \; s$ is also a linear combination of a and b.

Since

$$a \ mod \ s < s$$

and s is the smallest linear combination of a and b, $a \ mod \ s = 0$, and s divides a.

Similarly s divides b, and $gcd(a, b) \geq s$.

But $gcd(a, b)$ divides s, thus $s = gcd(a, b)$. $\square$

Theorem 3. *If e and $m = \phi(n)$ are relatively prime the equation*

$$ed = 1 \ mod \ m$$

has a unique solution for d.

Proof. Since $gcd(e, m) = 1$ there are integers x and y such that

$$ex + my = 1$$

or

$$ex - 1 = 0 \ mod \ m$$

□

Fermat's Theorem

Theorem 4. *For any integer a and prime p*

$$a^{p-1}\ mod\ p = 1$$

The Chinese Reminder Theorem

Corollary 1. *If $n_1, n_2, ..., n_k$ are pairwise relatively prime and $n = n_1 n_2 \cdot n_k$, then for all integer a and b,*

$$a = b \; mod \; n_i$$

for all $i = 1, ..., k$ iff

$$a = b \; mod \; n$$

Theorem 5. *Let* $gcd(p,q) = 1$ *and assume that*

$$M^{ed} = M \ mod \ p, \quad \textit{and} \quad M^{ed} = M \ mod \ q.$$

Let $n = pq$ *then*

$$M^{ed} = M \ mod \ n$$

Proof. There are integers k_1 and k_2 such that

$$M^{ed} = M + k_1 p, \quad \text{and} \quad M^{ed} = M + k_2 q.$$

Thus, $k_1 p = k_2 q$.

If $k_1 = k_2 = 0$, then $M^{ed} = M = M \ mod \ n$

Else, since $gcd(p,q) = 1$, q divides k_1 and

$$M^{ed} = M + k_3(pq) = M \ mod \ n.$$

□

Theorem 6. *The RSA system is correct, i.e.* $S_A(P_A(M)) = M$ *and* $P_A(S_A(M)) = M$.

Proof.

$$P_A(S_A(M)) = S_A(P_A(M)) = M^{ed} \; mod \; n.$$

We need to show that $M^{ed} \; mod \; n = M$.

Since $ed = 1 \; mod \; \phi(n)$, for some integer k $ed = 1 + k(p-1)(q-1)$.

If $M = 0 \; mod \; p$ then $M^{ed} = M \; mod \; p$,

If $M \neq 0 \; mod \; p$ then

$$\begin{aligned} M^{ed} &= M^{1+k(p-1)(q-1)} \; mod \; p \\ &= M(M^{p-1})^{k(q-1)} \; mod \; p \\ &= M \; mod \; p \end{aligned}$$

Similarly $M^{ed} = M \ mod \ q$.

We have

$$M^{ed} = M \ mod \ p$$
$$M^{ed} = M \ mod \ q$$

$n = pq$, thus by the Chinese reminder theorem for all M:

$$M^{ed} = M \ mod \ n$$

$\square$

Complexity

Theorem 7. *Encrypting and decrypting using the RSA method takes $O(\log n)$ multiplication steps.*

Security

If an adversary can factor n it can "guess" $S_A()$.

Conjecture: Factoring a large number is "hard".

Conjecture: If factoring is hard breaking RSA is hard.