# Shor's Factoring Algorithm

### 1 Introduction

The factoring problem can be posed in the following manner:

GIVEN: A composite N.

FIND: An  $N_1$  such that  $N_1 \neq 1$ , N and  $N_1|N$ .

This problem is widely assumed to be hard, even for the restricted case when N is the product of 2 primes. Moreover, this problem forms the basis for the well-known RSA public-key cryptosystem, hence finding an efficient factoring algorithm is of great practical interest. There do exist subexponential  $(2\sqrt[3]{logN})$  randomized algorithms for factoring. Today we will present Shor's quantum algorithm for factoring. We begin with some number theoretic preliminaries. Throughout our discussion we will assume that N is odd.

## 2 Number Theoretic Preliminaries

It is well known that factoring can be reduced to the following problem:

GIVEN: A composite N.

FIND: An x such that  $x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$  and  $x \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{N}$ .

Suppose we have found x as above. Then  $x^2 - 1 = (x - 1)(x + 1) = kN$  for some k. Since N|(x-1)(x+1) while  $N \not | (x+1)$  and  $N \not | (x-1)$ , some nontrivial factor of N must divide x+1. To find this factor it suffices to find (N, x+1) = the greatest common divisor of N and x+1, which can be done via Euclid's algorithm in  $O(n^3)$  time.

**Example:** Suppose that N=15. Then  $4^2\equiv 1 \pmod{N}$  while  $4\not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{N}$  hence (15,4-1)=5 and (15,4+1)=3 are both nontrivial factors of 15.

To factor N, then, it suffices to find a nontrivial square root of 1 in  $Z_N^*$ , where  $Z_N^*$  is the group whose underlying set is  $\{x|(x,N)=1,1\leq x\leq N\}$  and whose group operation is modN multiplication.

**Definition 1** The order of an element a in a group G, which we shall denote  $ord_G(a)$  (or ord(a) when the group G is clear from the context), is the least integer r such that  $a^r = 1_G$ .

**Definition 2**  $\Phi(n) = |\{x|1 \le x \le n \text{ and } (x,n) = 1\}|$ .  $(\Phi(n) \text{ is commonly referred to as the Euler phi function.})$ 

The following claim implies that if we can compute the order of  $a \in Z_N^*$  then we can find a nontrivial square root of one in  $Z_N^*$  (and therefore factor N) with high probability.

Claim 3  $\Pr_{a \in_R Z_N^*}[r = ord(a) \text{ is even and } a^{r/2} \not\equiv \pm 1] \geq 1/4.$ 

**Proof:** Let  $p_1^{e_1} p_2^{e_2} \cdots p_n^{e_n}$  be the prime factorization of N. By the Chinese remainder theorem,  $Z_N^* \cong Z_{p_1^{e_1}}^* \times Z_{p_2^{e_2}}^* \times \ldots \times Z_{p_n^{e_n}}^*$ . Let  $\Phi(N) = 2^l m$  and  $\Phi(p_i^{e_i}) = 2^{li} m_i$  where m and the  $m_i$  are odd. By the following

Fact 4  $Z_{P_i^{e_i}}^*$  is cyclic.

we can fix generators  $g_1, \ldots, g_n$  of  $Z_{p_1^{e_1}}^*, \ldots, Z_{p_n^{e_n}}^*$  respectively. Then choosing  $a \in_R Z_N^*$  is equivalent to choosing  $x_i \in_R \{1, 2, \ldots 2^{l_i} m_i\}$  independently for  $1 \leq i \leq n$  (by letting  $a = (g_1^{x_1}, g_2^{x_2}, \ldots, g_n^{x_n}) \in Z_{p_1^{e_1}}^* \times Z_{p_2^{e_2}}^* \times \ldots \times Z_{p_n^{e_n}}^*$ ).

The following two lemmas together yield our claim:

Lemma 5  $Pr_{a \in_R Z_N^*}[r = ord(a) \text{ is even }] \geq 1/2.$ 

**Proof:** The order of a in  $Z_N^*$  is the LCM of the set  $\{\frac{2^{l_1}m_1}{x_1}, \frac{2^{l_2}m_2}{x_2}, \dots, \frac{2^{l_n}m_n}{x_n}\}$ . Notice that since N is odd, each  $p_i$  is an odd prime and thus  $\Phi(p_i^{e_i})$  is even and  $l_i > 0$ . Thus if any of the  $x_n$  is odd then this LCM must be even. Since each  $x_n$  is chosen at random this probability is at least  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

Lemma 6  $\operatorname{Pr}_{a \in_R Z_N}[a^{r/2} \not\equiv \pm 1 | r = ord(a) \text{ is even }] \geq \frac{1}{2}$ .

**Proof:** Fix a and r = ord(a).  $a^{r/2}$  is the element  $\prod g_i^{x_i r/2}$ . Note that there are only two square roots of 1, namely  $\pm 1$ , in each  $Z_{p_i}^{*}$  (this follows easily from  $Z_{p_i}^{*}$  cyclic), and thus the only square roots of 1 in  $Z_N^*$  are of the form  $(\pm 1, \pm 1, \ldots, \pm 1)$ , with  $1 = (1, 1, \ldots, 1)$  and  $-1 = (-1, -1, \ldots, -1)$ .

We know that the  $g_i^{x_ir/2}$  are not identically 1 since then r would not be the order of a. Thus we need merely to bound the probability that the  $g_i^{x_ir/2}$  are all -1. The only way this can happen is if for each i the highest power of 2 dividing  $x_ir$  is  $l_i$ . Suppose we have chosen  $x_1$ . Let k be the highest power of 2 dividing  $x_1$ . In order for  $g_1^{x_1r/2}$  to be -1 the highest power of two dividing r must be  $l_1 - k > 0$ . The probability of choosing  $x_2$  so that the highest power of 2 dividing it is exactly  $l_2 - (l_1 - k)$  (and thus  $g_2^{x_2r/2} = -1$ ) is less than or equal to 1/2, as desired.

# 3 Simplified Quantum Algorithm for determining the order of $a \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$

Suppose we are given N and a random modN residue a. We wish to find  $r = ord_{Z_N^*}(a)$ . Suppose further that we have been given an integer q such that r|q. (Our quantum algorithm will involve a Fourier transform over  $Z_q$ . The assumption that r|q allows us to see the idea of the algorithm clearly-later we will show how to drop this assumption in exchange for a more complicated algorithm).

#### Algorithm 7 Our initial superposition is:

Performing a fourier transform over  $Z_q$  we obtain:

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}|N>|a>\sum_{x\in Z_q}|xmodq>|0modN>$$

By a classical computation we get:

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}|N>|a>\sum_{x\in Z_q}|xmodq>|a^xmodN>$$

Now we measure the value  $a^x mod N$  without disturbing the other bits on the tape. Let  $a^k$  be the observed value of  $a^x mod N$ . Our superposition will then collapse to the following:

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{q/r}}|N>|a>|a^k mod N>\sum_{x\in Z_q, x=lr+k}|x mod q>$$

In other words, we obtain a uniform superposition over some coset of  $\langle r \rangle$  (the subgroup of  $Z_q$  generated by r). Applying another fourier transform over  $Z_q$  we will then obtain a uniform superposition over  $\frac{Z_q}{\langle r \rangle}$ :

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{r}}|N>|a>|a^k mod N>\sum_{l=1 tor}|\frac{lq}{r}>$$

When we observe at this point we will see lq/r for a random l between 1 and r. With significant probability (l,q)=1 in which case  $(q,\frac{lq}{r})=\frac{q}{r}$ .

We can compute  $(q, \frac{lq}{r})$ , divide q by it, then check to see if this is truly the order of a. If so we are done, if not we can repeat the algorithm.