CS-ECON Seminar Series

Computational Aspects of Optimal Information Revelation

Speaker:Yu Cheng
Date: Friday, March 24, 2017
Time: 12:00pm - 1:00pm
Location: Gross 318, Duke
Lunch will be served.

Abstract

Understanding the role of information in strategic interactions is becoming more and more important in the age of information we live in today. The design of information structures is emerging as a new area of mechanism design for information, an area that is still largely unexplored. In this talk, we are going to examine the optimization problem faced by an informed principal, who must choose how to reveal partial information in order to induce a desirable equilibrium, a task often referred to as signaling or persuasion. We settle the computational complexity of optimal signaling in two of the most fundamental game-theoretic scenarios: Bayesian zero-sum games and network routing games.

Biography

Yu Cheng is a final year Ph.D. student in the Computer Science Department at the University of Southern California (USC), advised by Shang-Hua Teng. He is interested in the area of theoretical computer science, focusing on algorithmic game theory and spectral graph theory.