| conitzer at cs.duke.edu | |
| Office | D207 LSRC |
| Phone | (919) 660-6503 |
| Fax | (919) 660-6519 |
| Web page | http://www.cs.duke.edu/~conitzer/ |
Education
Ph.D., Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, 2006M.S., Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, 2003
A.B., Applied Mathematics, Harvard University, 2001
Honors & Awards
AAAI Outstanding Paper Award, 2008AAMAS Pragnesh Jay Modi Best Student Paper Award (co-author), 2008
Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship, 2008
ACM Doctoral Dissertation Award Honorable Mention, 2007
IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award, 2007
Best Program Committee Member Award, AAMAS 2006
IBM Ph.D. Fellow, 2005/2006
10th place, silver medalist, ACM Collegiate Programming Contest World Finals, 2001.
Selected Publications
- Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. New Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 63, Issue 2, 2008, pp. 621-641. Early version in IJCAI-03.
- Mingyu Guo and Vincent Conitzer. Worst-Case Optimal Redistribution of VCG Payments in Multi-Unit Auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 67, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 69-98. Early version in EC-07.
- Liad Wagman and Vincent Conitzer. Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting. In Proceedings of the 23rd National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-08), pp. 190-195, Chicago, IL, USA, 2008.
- Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer. A Sufficient Condition for Voting Rules to Be Frequently Manipulable. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-08), pp. 99-108, Chicago, IL, USA, 2008.
- Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, and Jérôme Lang. When Are Elections with Few Candidates Hard to Manipulate? Journal of the ACM, Volume 54, Issue 3, June 2007, Article 14, pp. 1-33. Early versions in AAAI-02 and TARK-03.
Extended List of Publications
Publications by Vincent Conitzer