Time/Place: Fridays, 2:45pm - 4:15pm at D344 LSRC.
Organizers: Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala.
Theme: Papers at the intersection of computer science and economics, focusing on more theoretical work.
02/05/10: On profit maximizing envy-free pricing (Sayan Bhattacharya)
02/12/10: Strategic Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains and Stackelberg Voting Games (Lirong Xia)
02/19/10: Approximation Algorithms for Single-minded Envy-free Profit-maximization Problems with Limited Supply (Sayan Bhattacharya)
02/26/10: On the Equilibria of Alternating Move Games (Dima Korzhyk)
03/05/10: Budget Feasible Mechanisms (Sayan Bhattacharya)
03/19/10: Strong Mediated Equilibrium (Josh Letchford)
03/26/10: Spring Break
04/02/10: Preliminary Exam Talk (Mingyu Guo)
04/09/10: Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy (Sayan Bhattacharya)
04/23/10: Research Initiation Project Talk (Dima Korzhyk)
Papers: If you are interested in presenting a paper on one of the following or related topics, please email Sayan Bhattacharya.
Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Optimal Mechansim Design and Money Burning
Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism Design
Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes
Designing networks with good equilibria
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Circumventing the Price of Anarchy: Leading Dynamics to Good Behavior
Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions
On the Equilibria of Alternating Move Games
Rationality and Traffic Attraction: Incentives for Honest Path Announcements in BGP
Neighbor-Specific BGP: More Flexible Routing Policies While Improving Global Stability
Incentive Compatibility and Dynamics of Congestion Control
Inapproximability for VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
On profit maximizing envy-free pricing
Charity auctions on social networks