Computational Microeconomics Reading Group (Spring '10)

 

Time/Place: Fridays, 2:45pm - 4:15pm at D344 LSRC.

Organizers: Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala.

Theme: Papers at the intersection of computer science and economics, focusing on more theoretical work.

 

Schedule:

02/05/10: On profit maximizing envy-free pricing (Sayan Bhattacharya)

02/12/10: Strategic Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains and Stackelberg Voting Games (Lirong Xia)

02/19/10: Approximation Algorithms for Single-minded Envy-free Profit-maximization Problems with Limited Supply (Sayan Bhattacharya)

02/26/10: On the Equilibria of Alternating Move Games (Dima Korzhyk)

03/05/10: Budget Feasible Mechanisms (Sayan Bhattacharya)

03/19/10: Strong Mediated Equilibrium (Josh Letchford)

03/26/10: Spring Break

04/02/10: Preliminary Exam Talk (Mingyu Guo)

04/09/10: Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy (Sayan Bhattacharya)

04/16/10:

04/23/10: Research Initiation Project Talk (Dima Korzhyk)

 

Papers: If you are interested in presenting a paper on one of the following or related topics, please email Sayan Bhattacharya.

Bayesian Mechanism Design

Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Optimal Mechansim Design and Money Burning

Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism Design

Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes

 

Price of Anarchy

Designing networks with good equilibria

Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy

Circumventing the Price of Anarchy: Leading Dynamics to Good Behavior

Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions

 

Nash Dynamics

On the Equilibria of Alternating Move Games

Rationality and Traffic Attraction: Incentives for Honest Path Announcements in BGP

Neighbor-Specific BGP: More Flexible Routing Policies While Improving Global Stability

Incentive Compatibility and Dynamics of Congestion Control

 

Auction Theory

Inapproximability for VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions

On profit maximizing envy-free pricing

Social lending

Charity auctions on social networks

 

Action Graph Games

 

Dynamic Mechanism Design

 

Auctions for Contracts and Sponsored Search

 

Combinatorial Prediction Markets

 

Strategy-proof Classification

 

Ranking Systems

 

Characterizations of Social Choice Functions