Vincent Conitzer
 Sally Dalton Robinson Professor of Computer Science
and
Professor of Economics

Levine Science Research Center, office D207
Box 90129, Duke University
Durham, NC 27708, USA


Assistance: please contact Gail for matters related to ACM TEAC, and Pam for other matters.
Jump to: announcements, brief bio, research interests, research group, publications by date, publications by topic, teaching, miscellaneous, humor.
ANNOUNCEMENTS

LOCAL: GLOBAL:
BRIEF BIO
Professional (for talk anouncements etc.): Vincent Conitzer is the Sally Dalton Robinson Professor of Computer Science and Professor of Economics at Duke University. He received Ph.D. (2006) and M.S. (2003) degrees in Computer Science from Carnegie Mellon University, and an A.B. (2001) degree in Applied Mathematics from Harvard University. His research focuses on computational aspects of microeconomics, in particular game theory, mechanism design, voting/social choice, and auctions. This work uses techniques from, and includes applications to, artificial intelligence and multiagent systems. Conitzer has received a Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers (PECASE), the IJCAI Computers and Thought Award, an NSF CAREER award, the inaugural Victor Lesser dissertation award, an honorable mention for the ACM dissertation award, and several awards for papers and service at the AAAI and AAMAS conferences. He has also been named a Kavli Fellow, a Bass Fellow, a Sloan Fellow, and one of AI's Ten to Watch. Conitzer and Preston McAfee are the founding Editors-in-Chief of the ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC).

Personal: I grew up in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Besides working and spending time with my wife, our daughter, and our dog, I enjoy sports including soccer, tennis, and judo, and at Duke it is hard to avoid playing basketball...

For more information: please see my CV.
RESEARCH INTERESTS
My research focuses on issues in the intersection of computer science (especially artificial intelligence) and economics (especially microeconomic theory). This includes the design of new marketplaces and other negotiation protocols that allow humans and software agents to express their preferences naturally and accurately, and that generate good outcomes based on these preferences. It also includes the design of software agents that can act strategically in settings where multiple parties all pursue their own interests. This requires the use of concepts from game theory, as well as operationalizing these concepts by finding efficient algorithms for computing the corresponding solutions. Finally, my research includes the study of all settings in computer science in which multiple parties will act in their own self-interest, as well as the design of incentive mechanisms to reach good outcomes in spite of such behavior. I am also interested in preventing the use of false identifiers (sybil attacks).
Some of the Wikipedia entries linked to above are imperfect; hopefully they will get better!
Slightly more detail.
Even more detail in my intellectual development statement for Duke.

Keywords: Computational microeconomics; artificial intelligence; multiagent systems; electronic commerce; game theory; mechanism design; auctions & exchanges; social choice & voting; anonymity-proofness; public goods & externalities; coalition formation; preference elicitation; resource-bounded reasoning; learning in games; game playing; computational & communication complexity; optimization; search; machine learning.
RESEARCH GROUP
(More people can be found on the cs-econ website.)
Information for students applying to my group.
Advice/opinions for students in my group.

I consider myself very fortunate to work and have worked with some extremely talented individuals.
Current Ph.D. students: Garrett Andersen (Computer Science), Dmytro (Dima) Korzhyk (Computer Science), Joshua (Josh) Letchford (Computer Science), Yuqian Li (Computer Science).
Current postdocs: Troels Bjerre Sørensen, Taiki Todo, Angelina Vidali.
Current M.S. students: Michael Albert.
Current undergraduates: Melissa Dalis.

Alumni:
Lirong Xia (Computer Science Ph.D. 2011, now a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard's Center for Research on Computation and Society (CRCS))
Mingyu Guo (Computer Science Ph.D. 2010, now a Lecturer (in the UK sense) in the University of Liverpool's Economics and Computation Group)
Liad (Leo) Wagman (Economics Ph.D. 2009, now an Assistant Professor at the Illinois Institute of Technology Stuart School of Business)
Peter Franklin (Econ+CS B.S. 2008, CS M.S. 2010, now at Zynga)
Joseph (Joe) Farfel (Computer Science M.S. 2007, now at Google)
Bo Waggoner (Math+CS B.S. 2011, now a CS Ph.D. student at Harvard)
Siyang Chen (Math B.S., CS B.S. 2012, now at Facebook)
Matthew Rognlie (Econ+Math B.S. 2010, now an Economics Ph.D. student at MIT)
Peng Shi (Math B.S. + CS B.A. + Econ minor 2010, now an Operations Research Ph.D. student at MIT)
Maggie Bashford (CS+Econ B.S. 2010, now at Deloitte)
PUBLICATIONS
By date; you can also see them by topic (automatically generated from this page, please let me know if you would like the code for this).

2013
Yuqian Li and Vincent Conitzer. Game-Theoretic Question Selection for Tests. To appear in Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-13), Beijing, China, 2013. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, commitment, Nash equilibrium, zero-sum games.

Garrett Andersen and Vincent Conitzer. Fast Equilibrium Computation for Infinitely Repeated Games. To appear in Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-13), Bellevue, WA, USA, 2013. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, repeated games, Nash equilibrium.

Joshua Letchford and Vincent Conitzer. Solving Security Games on Graphs via Marginal Probabilities. To appear in Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-13), Bellevue, WA, USA, 2013. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, security games, commitment.

Yuqian Li and Vincent Conitzer. Optimal Internet Auctions with Costly Communication. To appear in Proceedings of the Twelfth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-13), St. Paul, MN, USA, 2013. Full version. Keywords: mechanism design, preference elicitation.

Taiki Todo and Vincent Conitzer. False-name-proof Matching. To appear in Proceedings of the Twelfth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-13), St. Paul, MN, USA, 2013. Keywords: anonymity-proofness, mechanism design, matching.

Manish Jain, Vincent Conitzer, and Milind Tambe. Security Scheduling for Real-world Networks. To appear in Proceedings of the Twelfth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-13), St. Paul, MN, USA, 2013. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, security games, zero-sum games.

Mingyu Guo, Evangelos Markakis, Krzysztof R. Apt, and Vincent Conitzer. Undominated Groves Mechanisms. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), Volume 46, 2013, pp. 129-163. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design, VCG mechanism, revenue redistribution, combinatorial auctions and exchanges.

Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, and Ulle Endriss. Computational Social Choice. Chapter to appear in G. Weiss (Ed.), Multiagent Systems, MIT Press, 2013. Keywords: voting, voting in combinatorial domains, winner determination, hardness of manipulation, hardness of control, preference elicitation, communication complexity, compilation complexity, optimal voting rules, mechanism design, single-peaked preferences, anonymity-proofness, overviews.

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Volume 1, Issue 1, January 2013. Co-edited with Preston McAfee. Co-contributed The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation: An Introduction. Keywords: edited volumes.


2012
Joshua Letchford, Liam MacDermed, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr, and Charles Isbell. Computing Stackelberg Strategies in Stochastic Games. SIGecom Exchanges, Vol. 11, No. 2, December 2012, pp. 36-40. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, commitment, stochastic games, correlated strategies.

Sayan Bhattacharya, Dmytro Korzhyk, and Vincent Conitzer. Computing a Profit-Maximizing Sequence of Offers to Agents in a Social Network. Short (7-page) paper in Proceedings of the Eighth Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-12), pp. 482-488, Liverpool, UK, 2012. Keywords: social networks, externalities.

Vincent Conitzer. Computing Game-Theoretic Solutions and Applications to Security. In Proceedings of the 26th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-12), pp. 2106-2112, Toronto, ON, Canada, 2012. (Invited as a "What's Hot" paper to the AAAI-12 Sub-Area Spotlights track.) Keywords: noncooperative game theory, commitment, dominance and iterated dominance, extensive-form games, Nash equilibrium, security games, stochastic games, zero-sum games, overviews.

Bo Waggoner, Lirong Xia, and Vincent Conitzer. Evaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in Elections. In Proceedings of the 26th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-12), pp. 1485-1491, Toronto, ON, Canada, 2012. Keywords: anonymity-proofness, voting.

Joshua Letchford, Liam MacDermed, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr, and Charles Isbell. Computing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Stochastic Games. In Proceedings of the 26th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-12), pp. 1380-1386, Toronto, ON, Canada, 2012. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, commitment, stochastic games, correlated strategies.

Vincent Conitzer. An Undergraduate Course in the Intersection of Computer Science and Economics. In Proceedings of the Third AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence (EAAI-12), pp. 2357-2362, Toronto, ON, Canada, 2012. Keywords: education.

Vincent Conitzer and Lirong Xia. Paradoxes of Multiple Elections: An Approximation Approach. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-12), pp. 179-187, Rome, Italy, 2012. Keywords: voting, voting in combinatorial domains.

Vincent Conitzer, Curtis Taylor, and Liad Wagman. Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases. Marketing Science, Volume 31, Number 2, 2012, pp. 277-292. Keywords: anonymity, price discrimination.

Vincent Conitzer. Should Social Network Structure Be Taken into Account in Elections? Short communication in Mathematical Social Sciences (MSS), Special Issue on Computational Foundations of Social Choice, Volume 64, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 100-102. Keywords: voting, optimal voting rules, social networks.

Liad Wagman and Vincent Conitzer. Choosing Fair Lotteries to Defeat the Competition. International Journal of Game Theory (IJGT), Volume 41, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 91-129. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, Nash equilibrium.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Computing Optimal Outcomes under an Expressive Representation of Settings with Externalities. Journal of Computer and System Sciences (JCSS), Special Issue devoted to Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Volume 78, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 2-14. Keywords: expressive markets, public goods, externalities, winner determination.

Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS 2012). Co-edited with Michael Winikoff, Wiebe van der Hoek, and Lin Padgham. Keywords: edited volumes.


2011
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, and Kamesh Munagala. Approximation Algorithm for Security Games with Costly Resources. In Proceedings of the Seventh Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-11), pp. 13-24, Singapore, 2011. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, security games, commitment.

Mingyu Guo, Victor Naroditskiy, Vincent Conitzer, Amy Greenwald, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized Mechanisms: Public Goods and Beyond. In Proceedings of the Seventh Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-11), pp. 158-169, Singapore, 2011. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design, VCG mechanism, revenue redistribution.

Michael Zuckerman, Piotr Faliszewski, Vincent Conitzer, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. An NTU Cooperative Game Theoretic View of Manipulating Elections. In Proceedings of the Seventh Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-11), pp. 363-374, Singapore, 2011. Keywords: cooperative game theory, core, voting, hardness of manipulation.

Vincent Conitzer and Dmytro Korzhyk. Commitment to Correlated Strategies. In Proceedings of the 25th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-11), pp. 632-637, San Francisco, CA, USA, 2011. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, commitment, correlated strategies.

Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh, and Lirong Xia. Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information. In Proceedings of the 25th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-11), pp. 638-643, San Francisco, CA, USA, 2011. Keywords: voting, hardness of manipulation.

Dmytro Korzhyk, Zhengyu Yin, Christopher Kiekintveld, Vincent Conitzer, and Milind Tambe. Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), Volume 41, 2011, pp. 297-327. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, security games, commitment, Nash equilibrium.

Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, and Ronald Parr. Security Games with Multiple Attacker Resources. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-11), pp. 273-279, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, 2011. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, security games, commitment, Nash equilibrium.

Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer. A Maximum Likelihood Approach towards Aggregating Partial Orders. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-11), pp. 446-451, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, 2011. Keywords: voting, optimal voting rules.

Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, and Lirong Xia. Hypercubewise Preference Aggregation in Multi-issue Domains. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-11), pp. 158-163, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, 2011. Keywords: voting, voting in combinatorial domains.

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, and Jérôme Lang. Strategic Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains and Multiple-Election Paradoxes. In Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-11), pp. 179-188, San Jose, CA, USA, 2010. Keywords: voting, noncooperative game theory.

Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, and Ronald Parr. Solving Stackelberg Games with Uncertain Observability. In Proceedings of the Tenth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-11), pp. 1013-1020, Taipei, Taiwan, 2011. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, security games, commitment, Nash equilibrium.

Manish Jain, Dmytro Korzhyk, Ondrej Vanek, Vincent Conitzer, Michal Pechoucek, and Milind Tambe. A Double Oracle Algorithm for Zero-Sum Security Games on Graphs. In Proceedings of the Tenth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-11), pp. 327-334, Taipei, Taiwan, 2011. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, security games, zero-sum games.

Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer. Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), Volume 41, 2011, pp. 25-67. Keywords: voting, winner determination, preference elicitation, hardness of manipulation.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Expressive Markets for Donating to Charities. Artificial Intelligence (AIJ), Special Issue on Representing, Processing, and Learning Preferences: Theoretical and Practical Challenges, Volume 175, Issues 7-8, May 2011, pp. 1251-1271. Keywords: expressive markets, public goods, externalities, winner determination.

Joseph Farfel and Vincent Conitzer. Aggregating Value Ranges: Preference Elicitation and Truthfulness. Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (JAAMAS), Special Issue on Computational Social Choice, Volume 22, Number 1, January 2011, pp. 127-150. Keywords: voting, preference elicitation, single-peaked preferences, mechanism design.

Vincent Conitzer. Discussion of "A conditional game for comparing approximations." Discussion paper in Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics (AISTATS-11), Ft. Lauderdale, FL, USA, 2011. Keywords: discussion papers.

SIGecom Exchanges Volume 10.1. Co-edited with Yiling Chen. Co-contributed Introduction. Keywords: edited volumes.


2010
Vincent Conitzer, Nicole Immorlica, Joshua Letchford, Kamesh Munagala, and Liad Wagman. False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks. In Proceedings of the Sixth Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-10), pp. 209-221, Stanford, CA, 2010. Keywords: anonymity-proofness, mechanism design, social networks, voting.

Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer. Strategy-proof Voting Rules over Multi-issue Domains with Restricted Preferences. In Proceedings of the Sixth Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-10), pp. 402-414, Stanford, CA, 2010. Keywords: mechanism design, voting, voting in combinatorial domains.

Vincent Conitzer and Makoto Yokoo. Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False-Name Manipulations. AI Magazine, Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory, Volume 31, Issue 4, December 2010, pp. 65-77. Keywords: anonymity-proofness, voting, combinatorial auctions and exchanges, mechanism design.

Mingyu Guo and Vincent Conitzer. Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies. In Proceedings of the 24th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-10) -- NECTAR track, pp. 1676-1679, Atlanta, GA, USA, 2010. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design, VCG mechanism, revenue redistribution, combinatorial auctions and exchanges.

Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, and Ronald Parr. Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games. In Proceedings of the 24th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-10), pp. 805-810, Atlanta, GA, USA, 2010. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, security games, commitment.

Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer. Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes. In Proceedings of the 24th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-10), pp. 921-926, Atlanta, GA, USA, 2010. Keywords: voting, noncooperative game theory, commitment.

Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer. Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules. In Proceedings of the 24th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-10), pp. 915-920, Atlanta, GA, USA, 2010. Keywords: voting, compilation complexity.

Joshua Letchford and Vincent Conitzer. Computing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Extensive-Form Games. In Proceedings of the Eleventh ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-10), pp. 83-92, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2010. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, extensive-form games, commitment.

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, and Ariel D. Procaccia. A Scheduling Approach to Coalitional Manipulation. In Proceedings of the Eleventh ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-10), pp. 275-284, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2010. Keywords: voting, hardness of manipulation.

Mingyu Guo and Vincent Conitzer. Optimal-in-Expectation Redistribution Mechanisms. Artificial Intelligence, Volume 174, Issues 5-6, April 2010, pp. 363-381. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design, VCG mechanism, revenue redistribution, combinatorial auctions and exchanges.

Mingyu Guo and Vincent Conitzer. Strategy-proof Allocation of Multiple Items between Two Agents without Payments or Priors. In Proceedings of the Ninth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-10), pp. 881-888, Toronto, ON, Canada, 2010. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design.

Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Mingyu Guo, and Makoto Yokoo. Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. In Proceedings of the Ninth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-10), pp. 633-640, Toronto, ON, Canada, 2010. Keywords: anonymity-proofness, combinatorial auctions and exchanges, mechanism design.

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, and Jérôme Lang. Aggregating Preferences in Multi-Issue Domains by Using Maximum Likelihood Estimators. In Proceedings of the Ninth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-10), pp. 399-406, Toronto, ON, Canada, 2010. Keywords: voting, voting in combinatorial domains, optimal voting rules.

Zhengyu Yin, Dmytro Korzhyk, Christopher Kiekintveld, Vincent Conitzer, and Milind Tambe. Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness. In Proceedings of the Ninth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-10), pp. 1139-1146, Toronto, ON, Canada, 2010. See journal version above. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, security games, commitment, Nash equilibrium.

Mingyu Guo and Vincent Conitzer. False-Name-Proofness with Bid Withdrawal. arXiv:1208.6501; a two-page version appeared as a short paper in Proceedings of the Ninth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-10), pp. 1475-1476, Toronto, ON, Canada, 2010. Keywords: anonymity-proofness, combinatorial auctions and exchanges, mechanism design, automated mechanism design.

Vincent Conitzer. Comparing Multiagent Systems Research in Combinatorial Auctions and Voting. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (AMAI), Volume 58, Issue 3, 2010, pp. 239-259. Keywords: combinatorial auctions and exchanges, voting, overviews.

Vincent Conitzer. Making Decisions Based on the Preferences of Multiple Agents. Communications of the ACM (CACM), Volume 53, Number 3, March 2010, pp. 84-94. Keywords: voting, combinatorial auctions and exchanges, expressive markets, prediction markets, mechanism design, overviews.

Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala, and Lirong Xia. Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions. In the Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA-10), pp. 554-572, Austin, TX, USA, 2010. Keywords: combinatorial auctions and exchanges, mechanism design.

Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC 2010). Co-edited with Jörg Rothe. Keywords: edited volumes.

SIGecom Exchanges Volume 9.1. Contributed Introduction and Editor's Puzzle: Borrowing as Cheaply as Possible. Keywords: edited volumes.


2009
Peng Shi, Vincent Conitzer, and Mingyu Guo. Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions. In Proceedings of the Fifth Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-09), pp. 89-100, Rome, Italy, 2009. Keywords: prediction markets.

Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer, and Daniel Reeves. Competitive Repeated Allocation Without Payments. In Proceedings of the Fifth Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-09), pp. 244-255, Rome, Italy, 2009. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design.

Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, and Kamesh Munagala. Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To. In the Second International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT-09), pp. 250-262, Paphos, Cyprus, 2009. Full version with appendices. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, commitment, learning in games.

Vincent Conitzer. Approximation Guarantees for Fictitious Play. In the Proceedings of the 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton-09), pp. 636-643, Allerton Retreat Center, Monticello, IL, USA, 2009. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, learning in games, Nash equilibrium.

Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Ryo Ichimura, Yuko Sakurai, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations. In the Fifteenth International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP-09), pp. 623-638, Lisbon, Portugal, 2009. Keywords: cooperative game theory.

Vincent Conitzer. Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-09), pp. 101-108, Montreal, Canada, 2009. Keywords: prediction markets, mechanism design, cooperative game theory.

B. Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs M. de Weerdt, and Vincent Conitzer. A Qualitative Vickrey Auction. In Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-09), pp. 197-206, Stanford, CA, USA, 2009. Keywords: combinatorial auctions and exchanges, expressive markets, mechanism design.

Vincent Conitzer, Matthew Rognlie, and Lirong Xia. Preference Functions That Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation. In the Twenty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-09), pp. 109-115, Pasadena, CA, USA, 2009. Keywords: voting, optimal voting rules.

Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, and Lirong Xia. How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda? In the Twenty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-09), pp. 103-108, Pasadena, CA, USA, 2009. Keywords: voting, voting in combinatorial domains, hardness of control.

Erik Halvorson, Vincent Conitzer, and Ronald Parr. Multi-step Multi-sensor Hider-Seeker Games. In the Twenty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-09), pp. 159-166, Pasadena, CA, USA, 2009. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, zero-sum games.

Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer. Finite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules. In the Twenty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-09), pp. 336-341, Pasadena, CA, USA, 2009. Keywords: voting.

Lirong Xia, Michael Zuckerman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Vincent Conitzer, and Jeffrey Rosenschein. Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation Under Some Common Voting Rules. In the Twenty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-09), pp. 348-353, Pasadena, CA, USA, 2009. Keywords: voting, hardness of manipulation.

Joseph Farfel and Vincent Conitzer. Turing Trade: A hybrid of a Turing test and a prediction market. In Proceedings of The First Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA-09), pp. 61-73, Boston, MA, USA, 2009. A demo version at AAMAS 2009 appears as A Multiagent Turing Test Based on a Prediction Market (Extended Abstract), pp. 1407-1408. Keywords: prediction markets, Turing tests, games with a purpose.

Vincent Conitzer. Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), Volume 35, 2009, pp. 161-191. Earlier version appeared in Proceedings of the 6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-07), pp. 408-415, Honolulu, HI, USA, 2007. Keywords: voting, preference elicitation, single-peaked preferences.

Mingyu Guo and Vincent Conitzer. Worst-Case Optimal Redistribution of VCG Payments in Multi-Unit Auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, Special Section Dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Volume 67, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 69-98. Earlier version appeared in Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-07), pp. 30-39, San Diego, CA, USA. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design, VCG mechanism, revenue redistribution, combinatorial auctions and exchanges.

Vincent Conitzer. Auction Protocols. Chapter to appear in the CRC Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook. Keywords: combinatorial auctions and exchanges, overviews.

SIGecom Exchanges Volume 8.2. Contributed Introduction and Editor's Puzzle: A Dutch Dutch Auction Clock Auction. Keywords: edited volumes.

SIGecom Exchanges Volume 8.1. Contributed Introduction and Editor's Puzzle: Identifying the Champion. Keywords: edited volumes.


2008
Vincent Conitzer. Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. In Proceedings of the Fourth Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-08), pp. 295-306, Shanghai, China, 2008. Keywords: anonymity-proofness, voting, mechanism design.

Krzysztof Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, and Evangelos Markakis. Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms. In Proceedings of the Fourth Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-08), pp. 426-437, Shanghai, China, 2008. See journal version above. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design, VCG mechanism, revenue redistribution, combinatorial auctions and exchanges.

Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, and Kamal Jain. An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games. In Proceedings of the Fourth Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-08), pp. 696-707, Shanghai, China, 2008. Full version with appendices. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, alternative solution concepts.

Mingyu Guo and Vincent Conitzer. Better Redistribution with Inefficient Allocation in Multi-Unit Auctions with Unit Demand. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-08), pp. 210-219, Chicago, IL, USA, 2008. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design, VCG mechanism, revenue redistribution, combinatorial auctions and exchanges.

Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer. A Sufficient Condition for Voting Rules to Be Frequently Manipulable. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-08), pp. 99-108, Chicago, IL, USA, 2008. Keywords: voting, hardness of manipulation.

Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer. Generalized Scoring Rules and the Frequency of Coalitional Manipulability. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-08), pp. 109-118, Chicago, IL, USA, 2008. Keywords: voting, hardness of manipulation.

Liad Wagman and Vincent Conitzer. Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting. In Proceedings of the 23rd National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-08), pp. 190-195, Chicago, IL, USA, 2008. Winner of one of two Outstanding Paper Awards. Keywords: anonymity-proofness, voting, mechanism design.

Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer. Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders. In Proceedings of the 23rd National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-08), pp. 196-201, Chicago, IL, USA, 2008. See journal version above. Keywords: voting, winner determination, preference elicitation, hardness of manipulation.

Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, and Jérôme Lang. Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies. In Proceedings of the 23rd National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-08), pp. 202-207, Chicago, IL, USA, 2008. Keywords: voting, voting in combinatorial domains.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. New Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue on the Second World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Volume 63, Issue 2, 2008, pp. 621-641. Earlier version appeared in Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-03), pp. 765-771, Acapulco, Mexico, 2003. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, Nash equilibrium.

Mingyu Guo and Vincent Conitzer. Optimal-in-Expectation Redistribution Mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-08), pp. 1047-1054, Estoril, Portugal, 2008. See journal version above. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design, VCG mechanism, revenue redistribution, combinatorial auctions and exchanges.

Mingyu Guo and Vincent Conitzer. Undominated VCG Redistribution Mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-08), pp. 1039-1046, Estoril, Portugal, 2008. Also see journal version above. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design, VCG mechanism, revenue redistribution, combinatorial auctions and exchanges.

Liad Wagman and Vincent Conitzer. Strategic Betting for Competitive Agents. In Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-08), pp. 847-854, Estoril, Portugal, 2008. See journal version above. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, Nash equilibrium.

Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. Anonymity-Proof Shapley Value: Extending Shapley Value for Coalitional Games in Open Environments. In Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-08), pp. 927-934, Estoril, Portugal, 2008. Winner of the Pragnesh Jay Modi Best Student Paper Award. Keywords: cooperative game theory, anonymity-proofness, collusion, Shapley value.

Vincent Conitzer. Comparing Multiagent Systems Research in Combinatorial Auctions and Voting. The 10th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics (ISAIM-08), Fort Lauderdale, FL, USA. (Paper corresponding to an invited talk.) See journal version above. Keywords: combinatorial auctions and exchanges, voting, overviews.

Vincent Conitzer. Using a Memory Test to Limit a User to One Account. The 10th International Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC-08), Estoril, Portugal. Appears in LNBIP 44, Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agent Design and Analysis, pp. 60-72. Keywords: anonymity-proofness.

Vincent Conitzer. Metareasoning as a Formal Computational Problem. The AAAI-08 Workshop on Metareasoning: Thinking about Thinking, Chicago, IL, USA, 2008. Keywords: resource-bounded reasoning.

Mehmet Serkan Apaydin, Vincent Conitzer, and Bruce Randall Donald. Structure-based protein NMR assignments using native structural ensembles. Journal of Biomolecular NMR, 2008; 40(4):263-276. PMID: 18365752. Keywords: computational biology, voting, optimal voting rules.

SIGecom Exchanges Volume 7.3. Contributed Introduction and Editor's Puzzle: Product Adoption in a Social Network. Keywords: edited volumes.

SIGecom Exchanges Volume 7.2. Contributed Introduction and Editor's Puzzle: Strategically Choosing Products to Release. Keywords: edited volumes.


2007
Vincent Conitzer. Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness. In Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-07), pp. 102-111, Brussels, Belgium. Keywords: anonymity-proofness, mechanism design, combinatorial auctions and exchanges, voting.

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, and Jérôme Lang. When Are Elections with Few Candidates Hard to Manipulate? Journal of the ACM (JACM), Volume 54, Issue 3, June 2007, Article 14 (33 pages). Supersedes "How Many Candidates Are Needed to Make Elections Hard to Manipulate?" (TARK-03, pp. 201-214) and "Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates" (AAAI-02, pp. 314-319). Keywords: voting, hardness of manipulation.

Mingyu Guo and Vincent Conitzer. Worst-Case Optimal Redistribution of VCG Payments. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-07), pp. 30-39, San Diego, CA, USA. See journal version above. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design, VCG mechanism, revenue redistribution, combinatorial auctions and exchanges.

Vincent Conitzer. Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries. In Proceedings of the 6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-07), pp. 408-415, Honolulu, HI, USA, 2007. See journal version above. Keywords: voting, preference elicitation, single-peaked preferences.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Incremental Mechanism Design. In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-07), pp. 1251-1256, Hyderabad, India, 2007. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design, VCG mechanism, voting, hardness of manipulation.

Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, and Craig Boutilier. Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-07), pp. 1500-1506, Hyderabad, India, 2007. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design, preference elicitation.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. Machine Learning, Special Issue on Learning and Computational Game Theory, Volume 67, Numbers 1-2, May 2007, pp. 23-43. Earlier version appeared in Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML-03), pp. 83-90, Washington, DC, USA, 2003. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, learning in games, Nash equilibrium.

SIGecom Exchanges Volume 7.1. Contributed Introduction and Editor's Puzzle: Combinatorial Auction Winner Determination. Keywords: edited volumes.


2006
Vincent Conitzer. Computational Aspects of Preference Aggregation. Ph.D. Dissertation. Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, July 2006. Available as technical report CMU-CS-06-145. Winner of the 2006 IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award and an Honorable Mention for the 2007 ACM Doctoral Dissertation Award. Abstract, acknowledgements, contents. Chapter 1: Introduction. Chapter 2: Expressive Preference Aggregation Settings (review of voting, task and resource allocation, and other settings). Chapter 3: Outcome Optimization (winner determination in voting, combinatorial auctions, and other settings). Chapter 4: Mechanism Design (review). Chapter 5: Difficulties for Classical Mechanism Design (limitations of VCG and other impossibilities). Chapter 6: Automated Mechanism Design. Chapter 7: Game-Theoretic Foundations of Mechanism Design (review of game theory and the revelation principle). Chapter 8: Mechanism Design for Bounded Agents (revelation principle failure and hardness of manipulation in voting). Chapter 9: Computing Game-Theoretic Solutions (Nash equilibrium, dominance, and others). Chapter 10: Automated Mechanism Design for Bounded Agents (incremental mechanism design). Chapter 11: Conclusions and Future Research. Bibliography. Keywords: overviews.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity of Constructing Solutions in the Core Based on Synergies Among Coalitions. Artificial Intelligence, Volume 170, Issues 6-7, May 2006, pp. 607-619. Earlier version appeared as "Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core" in Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-03), pp. 613-618, Acapulco, Mexico, 2003. Keywords: cooperative game theory, core.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Computing the Optimal Strategy to Commit To. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-06), pp. 82-90, Ann Arbor, MI, USA, 2006. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, commitment.

Vincent Conitzer. Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities Among Candidates. In Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-06), pp. 613-619, Boston, MA, USA, 2006. Early version: IBM Research Report RC23748. Keywords: voting, winner determination.

Vincent Conitzer, Andrew Davenport, and Jayant Kalagnanam. Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings. In Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-06), pp. 620-626, Boston, MA, USA, 2006. Keywords: voting, winner determination.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. In Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-06), pp. 627-634, Boston, MA, USA, 2006. Keywords: voting, hardness of manipulation.

Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, and Tuomas Sandholm. A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. In Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-06), pp. 697-702, Boston, MA, USA, 2006. Keywords: cooperative game theory, anonymity-proofness, collusion, core, nucleolus.

Vincent Conitzer and Nikesh Garera. Learning Algorithms for Online Principal-Agent Problems (and Selling Goods Online). In Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML-06), pp. 209-216, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA, 2006. Keywords: learning in markets.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. A Technique for Reducing Normal-Form Games to Compute a Nash Equilibrium. In Proceedings of the 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-06), pp. 537-544, Hakodate, Japan, 2006. One of four runners-up for the Best Student Paper Award. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, Nash equilibrium.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Failures of the VCG Mechanism in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges. In Proceedings of the 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-06), pp. 521-528, Hakodate, Japan, 2006. Keywords: combinatorial auctions and exchanges, mechanism design, collusion, VCG mechanism.


2005
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Communication Complexity of Common Voting Rules. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-05), pp. 78-87, Vancouver, Canada, 2005. Keywords: voting, preference elicitation, communication complexity.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity of (Iterated) Dominance. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-05), pp. 88-97, Vancouver, Canada, 2005. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, dominance and iterated dominance.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-05), pp. 145-152, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK, 2005. Keywords: voting, optimal voting rules.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It. In Proceedings of the 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-05), pp. 483-488, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA, 2005. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, Nash equilibrium, dominance and iterated dominance, alternative solution concepts.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities. In Proceedings of the 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-05), pp. 255-260, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA, 2005. See journal version above. Keywords: expressive markets, public goods, externalities, winner determination.

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, and Paolo Santi. Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations. In Proceedings of the 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-05), pp. 248-254, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA, 2005. Keywords: combinatorial auctions and exchanges, winner determination, preference elicitation.

Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, and Atsushi Iwasaki. Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. In Proceedings of the 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-05), pp. 509-514, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA, 2005. This paper was also presented at the 19th Annual Conference of the Japan Society for Artificial Intelligence (JSAI-05) where it was one of five Awarded Papers. Keywords: cooperative game theory, anonymity-proofness, collusion, core, nucleolus, Shapley value.

Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, and Vincent Conitzer. Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria. In Proceedings of the 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-05), pp. 495-501, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA, 2005. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, Nash equilibrium.

Vincent Conitzer. Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design. In Proceedings of the 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-05) (Doctoral Consortium), pp. 1642-1643, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 2005. Keywords: overviews.


2004
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Expressive Negotiation over Donations to Charities. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-04), pp. 51-60, New York, NY, USA, 2004. See journal version above. Keywords: expressive markets, public goods, externalities, winner determination.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Self-Interested Automated Mechanism Design and Implications for Optimal Combinatorial Auctions. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-04), pp. 132-141, New York, NY, USA, 2004. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design, combinatorial auctions and exchanges.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains. In Proceedings of the 19th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-04), pp. 219-225, San Jose, California, USA, 2004. Keywords: cooperative game theory, core, Shapley value.

Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, and Tuomas Sandholm. Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs. In Proceedings of the 19th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-04), pp. 212-218, San Jose, California, USA, 2004. Keywords: combinatorial auctions and exchanges, winner determination.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Communication Complexity as a Lower Bound for Learning in Games. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML-04), pp. 185-192, Banff, Alberta, Canada, 2004. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, learning in games, communication complexity, Nash equilibrium, dominance and iterated dominance, backward induction.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS-04), pp. 128-135, New York, NY, USA, 2004. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design.

Paolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, and Tuomas Sandholm. Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions. In Proceedings of the 17th Annual Conference on Learning Theory (COLT-04), pp. 1-16, Banff, Alberta, Canada, 2004. Keywords: combinatorial auctions and exchanges, preference elicitation.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Computational Criticisms of the Revelation Principle. Short paper in Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-04), pp. 262-263, New York, NY, USA, 2004. Also presented orally at the Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT-04), Leipzig, Germany, 2004. Keywords: mechanism design, hardness of manipulation.


2003
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. In Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-03), pp. 765-771, Acapulco, Mexico, 2003. See journal version above. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, Nash equilibrium.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. In Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-03), pp. 781-788, Acapulco, Mexico, 2003. Keywords: voting, hardness of manipulation.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. In Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-03), pp. 1099-1106, Acapulco, Mexico, 2003. Keywords: resource-bounded reasoning.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. In Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-03), pp. 613-618, Acapulco, Mexico, 2003. See journal version above. Keywords: cooperative game theory, core.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML-03), pp. 83-90, Washington, DC, USA, 2003. See journal version above. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, learning in games, Nash equilibrium.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML-03), pp. 91-98, Washington, DC, USA, 2003. Keywords: noncooperative game theory, learning in games, zero-sum games.

Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, and Tuomas Sandholm. How Many Candidates Are Needed to Make Elections Hard to Manipulate? In Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-03), pp. 201-214, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, 2003. See journal version above. Keywords: voting, hardness of manipulation.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results Stemming from the Single-Agent Setting. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC-03), pp. 17-24, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 2003. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Applications of Automated Mechanism Design. Early version: the UAI-03 Bayesian Modeling Applications Workshop, Acapulco, Mexico, 2003. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Automated Mechanism Design with a Structured Outcome Space. Draft, 2003. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design.


2002
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity of Mechanism Design. In Proceedings of the 18th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-02), pp. 103-110, Edmonton, Canada, 2002. Keywords: mechanism design, automated mechanism design.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. In Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-02), pp. 314-319, Edmonton, Canada, 2002. See journal version above. Keywords: voting, hardness of manipulation.

Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. In Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-02), pp. 392-397, Edmonton, Canada, 2002. Keywords: voting, preference elicitation.
TEACHING
CPS 590.1 (Fall 2012): Linear and Integer Programming.
CPS 173 (Spring 2012): Computational Microeconomics.
CPS 296.1 (Fall 2011): Computational Microeconomics: Game Theory, Social Choice, and Mechanism Design.
CPS 296.1 (Fall 2010): Linear and Integer Programming.
CPS 173 (Spring 2010): Computational Microeconomics.
CPS 196.1/296.1 (Fall 2009): Computational Microeconomics: Game Theory, Social Choice, and Mechanism Design.
CPS 170 (Spring 2009): Introduction to Artificial Intelligence.
CPS 270 (Fall 2008): Artificial Intelligence.
CPS 196/296.2 (Spring 2008): Linear and Integer Programming.
CPS 196.2 (Fall 2007): Introduction to Computational Economics.
CPS 296.3 (Spring 2007): Topics in Computational Economics.
CPS 296.2 (Fall 2006): Computational Game Theory and Mechanism Design.
MISCELLANEOUS
ESS draft.

IJCAI 2011 Computers and Thought talk: slides without animation, slides with animation. The paper for my AAAI 2012 "What's Hot" talk covers similar material as the talk. For an overview of some other work, maybe see my 2010 CACM article.

Computational Social Choice tutorial from the 2012 Summer School on Algorithmic Economics at CMU: ppt, pdf. (Earlier versions at COMSOC-10 (ppt, pdf) and with Ariel Procaccia at EC-10 and AAMAS-10 (my slides (ppt, pdf), Ariel's slides).)

Tutorial: Automated Mechanism Design: Approaches and Applications (ppt (my slides only), pdf (also including Eugene's slides)). Given at EC-08, AAMAS-09, IJCAI-09 with Yevgeniy (Eugene) Vorobeychik.

Attracting Students to Computer Science Using Artificial Intelligence, Economics, and Linear Programming (.ppt, .pdf). (Invited talk at the 2008 AAAI Spring Symposium on Using AI to Motivate Greater Participation in Computer Science, and a 2010 ARTSI faculty workshop.)

Tutorial: Mechanism Design for Multiagent Systems (.ppt, .pdf). Given at the Dubai Agents & Multi-Agent Systems School 2008, and an earlier version at NESCAI 2006.

A game-theoretically optimal computer player for a class of Liar's Dice games (source code). Let me know if you find bugs/have comments. (Apologies for the archaic text-based interface...)

A puzzle - let me know if you solve it. Here are some hints, as well as the first few steps of the solution, and even a translation into French by Dany Bergeron. (For more puzzles, see SIGecom Exchanges.)

A 5-line integer program formulation for Sudoku in GMPL, the modeling language for GLPK (GNU Linear Programming Kit). (I'm certainly not the first to come up with such a formulation, e.g. here.) The example puzzle is from Wikipedia's Sudoku page (and solves in 0.0 seconds).

"Contizer" is the most common misspelling of my family's name; I wonder what causes this particular typo (rather than others with the same edit distance)? Of course, this is nothing compared to the misspellings of "Atila Abdulkadiroglu".
HUMOR
Mike Shor's humor page + funny incentives in soccer.
Sergiu Hart's humor page.
FAIL Blog.
Funny game show answers: Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? (French version), Family Feud, Are You Smarter Than a Fifth Grader?, Wheel of Fortune, a variety of funny answers.
Other: Love Two Point Oh.