Landon Cox

SpanDex at USENIX Security

We just posted our upcoming paper on SpanDex, which will be presented at USENIX Security ’14 in August.

SpanDex prevents malicious mobile apps from phishing users' passwords by ensuring that a password can only be forwarded to trusted servers. The primary technical challenge addressed by SpanDex is precise, sound, and efficient handling of implicit information flows (e.g., information transferred by a program’s control flow). The long-standing problem of implicit flows is one of my favorites in computer security. It’s an incredibly hard problem (probably impossible to solve in the general case), but I think we’ve made a nice little contribution with this paper. Prior approaches to tracking implicit flows either ignored these flows altogether (e.g., TaintDroid), allowing malicious code to easily leak sensitive information, or induced overtainting in non-malicious apps so that nearly all messages appeared to leak sensitive information.

The key observation underlying SpanDex is that most branching on sensitive data transfers very little secret information. For example, mobile apps typically only branch on password characters to perform simple formatting checks. The aggregate information revealed through these implicit flows is almost always that a password is well formatted, and disclosing that a password is well formatted poses no threat to a user.

Using this observation, SpanDex handles implicit flows by borrowing techniques from symbolic execution to precisely quantify the amount of information a process’ control flow reveals about a secret. So long as the information revealed by an execution path reveals a safe amount of information (e.g., that a password is well formatted), SpanDex does not track the influence of implicit flows on a program's state and thus avoids overtainting. At the same time, quantifying the amount of information revealed through implicit flows during execution allows SpanDex to prevent a malicious app from using control flow to leak passwords. To apply this techniques at runtime without sacrificing performance, SpanDex runs untrusted code in a data-flow sensitive sandbox that limits the mix of operations that an app can perform on sensitive data.

Experiments with a SpanDex prototype for Android using 50 popular apps and an analysis of a large list of leaked passwords predicts that for 90% of users, an attacker would need over 80 login attempts to guess their password. Today the same attacker would need only one attempt for all users.

TaintDroid for Android 4.3

Announcement from the NCSU guys:

The TaintDroid team is happy to announce the release of TaintDroid for Android 4.3_r1. The instructions for obtaining and building this version are available as usual on

We also have an issue tracker set up at for reporting bugs with TaintDroid. If you notice any bugs with the new release of TaintDroid, or with any of the previous versions, please submit a bug report on the issue tracker. If you have a solution for the bug fix, please also submit it in the bug report. Since TaintDroid is maintained by a small group of people, your feedback is greatly appreciated and crucial for the ongoing maintenance of TaintDroid.

We are also working on constructing a suite of regression tests for TaintDroid, which will be uploaded to Github as soon as it is complete.

-Ben Andow

ScreenPass at MobiSys

We just posted our upcoming paper on ScreenPass, which will be presented at MobiSys ’13 in June. My group has been thinking about the problem of securing passwords on mobile devices a lot lately, and we think that ScreenPass is a big part of the solution.

Passwords are a critical glue between mobile apps and remote cloud services, and nearly all of the apps that I install ask for one or more passwords. Many people would like us to move beyond password-based authentication, but I doubt that this will happen anytime soon. Given how important and sensitive passwords are, it shouldn’t be a surprise that researchers have already found at least one malicious, password-stealing app in the wild (a very convincing fake NetFlix app). I suspect that we will see more of these kinds of attacks in the future.

The problem is that, right now, I have no idea what happens to the passwords I give to my apps. I’d like to know that if I give my Facebook password to an app, the data will only be sent to Facebook servers. Taint-tracking password data is almost certainly a big part of the solution, but secure password entry is also crucial. This is because password data can’t be tracked unless it is tagged by the operating system beforehand. If a malicious app can trick a user into inputting their password without the operating system’s knowledge, then there is no way for the OS to guarantee that my Facebook password is sent to only Facebook. This is where ScreenPass comes in.

ScreenPass guarantees that whenever a user enters her password, she can always (1) tell the operating system where it should be sent, and (2) know where the operating system thinks it should be sent. We provide these guarantees by ensuring that only a trusted software keyboard handles text input. In particular, ScreenPass performs optical character recognition (OCR) on the display at runtime to detect malicious apps that try to spoof the trusted software keyboard. ScreenPass is unique in that it is the first secure user interface to regulate what an app is allowed to write to the display (instead of regulating only where it can write on the display). There are many more details in the paper, including our ScreenPass prototype’s usability and energy overheads, as well as the results of a small app study (spoiler alert: we found a handful of non-malicious apps that send passwords to places you might not expect, and we easily detected the fake NetFlix app).

ScreenPass took several years to develop; we had a number of false starts early on, and it took a long time to put together a convincing evaluation. However, I’m very happy with the final paper, and am looking forward to presenting our work in Taipei in June!

TaintDroid for Android 4.1

Announcement from Will Enck:
The TaintDroid team is happy to announce the release of TaintDroid for Android 4.1.1_r6. The instructions for obtaining and building this version are available as usual on

We would specially like to thank Minh Tuan Pham for porting the bulk of
TaintDroid from Android 2.3.4 to Android 4.0.3, which was nontrivial due to the significant changes between the versions. Minh also added tracking support for ByteBuffers.

We would also like to thank Peter Gilbert for porting the "fast" and JIT Dalvik VM interpreters to Android 4.0.3, as well as all of the changes to Android
4.1.1_r6, and preparing the code for release.

Also with this release, we have included a compile-time option for byte-level tracking within Parcel IPC messages, which was implemented by Seungyeop Han at University of Washington. Seungyeop also contributed several bug fixes to

Finally, along with this release, we have included the source code for TaintDroidNotify, which was written by Gabriel Maganis at UC Davis.

Happy tracking!
Will Enck and the
TaintDroid Team

YouProve video

A quick demo of our YouProve prototype. More info is available in our SenSys ’11 paper.