Approval Voting, Proportional Representation, & Liquid Democracy
CS-ECON Seminar Series
Date and Time
Gross Hall 304B, Duke
In this talk, I will survey recent results concerning the proportional representation of voters in approval-based committee elections. In this setting, voters express their preferences over a set of candidates by specifying, for each candidate, whether they approve (\"like\") that candidate or not. Based on these approval votes, a fixed-size subset of winning candidates needs to be selected. I will also discuss proportional rankings, where the goal is to rank-order the candidates in a way that is representative of voters' preferences. As an example application scenario where such rankings are desirable, I will briefly outline some ideas related to \"liquid democracy\", an exciting new paradigm for collective decision making with many participants.
Markus Brill is an assistant professor of Computer Science at TU Berlin, Germany. After receiving a Ph.D. from TU Munich in 2012, he spent two years as a postdoctoral researcher at Duke University and one year at the University of Oxford. His research focuses on axiomatic and computational aspects of social choice and game theory. He is the recipient of a Feodor Lynen Research Fellowship, awarded by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and of a research grant in the Emmy Noether Programme by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).