Communication-Efficient BFT Protocols Using Small Trusted Hardware to Tolerate Minority Corruption

Duke Privacy and Security Seminar
Speaker Name
Sravya Yandamuri
Date and Time
-
Location
The talk will be virtual on Zoom.
Notes
The Zoom link will be emailed to CS faculty/grad students, or contact Jennifer Schmidt (jschmidt at cs.duke.edu) to request it.
Abstract

Agreement protocols for partially synchronous or asynchronous networks tolerate fewer than one-third Byzantine faults. If parties are equipped with trusted hardware that prevents equivocation, then fault tolerance can be improved to fewer than one-half Byzantine faults, but typically at the cost of increased communication complexity. In this work, we present results that use small trusted hardware without worsening communication complexity assuming the adversary controls a fraction of the network that is less than one-half. Our results include a version of HotStuff that retains linear communication complexity in each view and a version of the VABA protocol with quadratic communication, both leveraging trusted hardware to tolerate a minority of corruptions.  Our results use expander graphs to achieve efficient communication in a manner that may be of independent interest.

Short Biography

Sravya is a second year CS Ph.D. student advised by Kartik Nayak. Her research interests include consensus protocols and blockchain.

Host
Johes Bater